Normativity, Moral and Epistemic

One of the primary motivations for moral antirealism is that if there were moral facts, they would have metaphysically and epistemologically puzzling features: in particular, moral facts, if they existed, would be categorically normative. An important objection to moral antirealism is that epistemic norms seem to have the same objectionable features as moral norms. Epistemic norms and moral norms are "companions in guilt". Hence, the moral antirealist is committed to an implausible epistemic antirealism. This video outlines the companions-in-guilt argument, and then surveys a number of responses: embracing epistemic antirealism (epistemic error theory and epistemic expressivism), challenging the parity between moral and epistemic norms, and Cowie's dilemma.

0:30 - the queerness argument and categorical vs hypothetical imperatives
4:10 - the companions-in-guilt argument
9:40 - response #1: epistemic error theory
12:20 - Cuneo's objections to epistemic error theory
27:40 - response #2: epistemic expressivism
30:45 - Cuneo's objection to epistemic expressivism
37:30 - objection to both error theory and expressivism: might hypothetical norms be queer also?
46:15 - response #3: challenging the parity premise
55:00 - response #4: Cowie's dilemma for the companions-in-guilt argument

philosophy,metaethics,normativity,epistemology,expressivism,error theory,